RE: [External] : Re: Block connection from SQL developer
Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2022 12:50:17 +0000
Message-ID: <SJ0PR10MB46865028B451B96884E4BED5A30F9_at_SJ0PR10MB4686.namprd10.prod.outlook.com>
Two things:
- Blaming the intern…such BS
- Devs in prod, I used to agree. But devs aren’t devs anymore. They’re DevOps, and yeah they’re in production. Hopefully in just a controlled and automated fashion as much as possible.
From: oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org <oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org> On Behalf Of Frank Gordon
Sent: Monday, March 14, 2022 8:24 AM
To: gogala.mladen_at_gmail.com
Cc: oracle-l_at_freelists.org
Subject: [External] : Re: Block connection from SQL developer
On Sun, Mar 13, 2022 at 7:05 PM Mladen Gogala <gogala.mladen_at_gmail.com<mailto:gogala.mladen_at_gmail.com>> wrote:
On 3/13/22 11:42, Dave Morgan wrote:
The only practical way to control connection level access is with a logon trigger supported with automated auditing and monitoring. Limitations based on hostname and/or IP address can also be set in sqlnet.ora.
Agreed
In my environment the issue is developers who "have to" connect to production to "do their job". So, I do not return any errors I use a sleep(6000) call in the trigger. It is hard to complain about a problem when you should not be there
There is no reason whatsoever for developer to connect to production. In the good old times of my youth (think Perl 4 and "oraperl") there was a saying cautioning people to not trust programmers carrying screwdrivers. The times of programmers with screwdrivers and pliers are long gone but the same saying is applicable to the production databases: developers have no business connecting to the production database of, for that matter, production application server(s). Developers should document their products so that they can be installed by the maintenance engineers. Any developer caught trying to connect to the higher environments (QA, UAT, PROD) should be terminated on the spot. One of the foremost security measures is the separation of duties and the physical separation of the environments.
The infamous "Solar Winds" case was caused by an intern in charge of the software upload site and the weal password (SolarWinds123). I hope that the intern has now been promoted to the managerial position of PHB. The vast majority of break-ins is caused by the human error. Developer with access to the higher environments is pretty typical. If things are supposed to be confidential, then confide in very few people and make sure that nobody else has the confidential information. It's elementary, my dear Dave.
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Mladen Gogala
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Received on Mon Mar 14 2022 - 13:50:17 CET