RE: Meltdown and spectre
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 13:09:34 +0000
Message-ID: <A66A222B7625DC479778336ACBC73A1F211FD35A_at_NSTMC736PN2.UBSPROD.MSAD.UBS.NET>
Note that IBM main frame is not impacted unless you count a windows console with a X86 architecture
I think there is a parallel similar to Android and Apple If you control the entire eco system you decide all levels of control and what sort of optimization will happen where If you don't then everyone is sort of piggy backing to reduce their own work and overhead And thus you then get into a finger pointing and drawing of battle lines on what belongs where and who owns and needs to fix it. And depending on your individual philosophy you are bound to take/choose sides
From: Stefan Knecht [mailto:knecht.stefan_at_gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, January 05, 2018 4:58 PM
To: dmarc-noreply_at_freelists.org
Cc: tim_at_oracle-base.com; Pande, Rajendra; Andrew Kerber; Mark W. Farnham; oracle-l_at_freelists.org; fmhabash_at_gmail.com; niall.litchfield_at_gmail.com
Subject: Re: Meltdown and spectre
I'm not a CPU engineer - but from my understanding, CPUs try to optimize by "predicting" where they will need to jump to. And apparently that's something that people can abuse.
The very first paragraph kind of has it all:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/
"We have discovered that CPU data cache timing can be abused to efficiently leak information out of mis-speculated execution, leading to (at worst) arbitrary virtual memory read vulnerabilities across local security boundaries in various contexts."
The key being "mis-speculated". They apparently thought that it's a good idea to execute something ahead of time, just in case we will need to execute it. How no-one imagined the potential abuse is beyond me.
Also interesting to see Linus Torvald's response to all of this: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/1/3/797
Stefan
On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 4:34 AM, Reen, Elizabeth <dmarc-noreply_at_freelists.org<mailto:dmarc-noreply_at_freelists.org>> wrote:
All of that happens in the O/S not on the chip. One does not log into a processor.
Liz
Elizabeth Reen
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From: oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org<mailto:oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org> [mailto:oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org<mailto:oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org>] On Behalf Of Tim Hall
Sent: Friday, January 05, 2018 4:06 PM
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Cc: Andrew Kerber; Mark W. Farnham; oracle-l_at_freelists.org<mailto:oracle-l_at_freelists.org>; dmarc-noreply_at_freelists.org<mailto:dmarc-noreply_at_freelists.org>; fmhabash_at_gmail.com<mailto:fmhabash_at_gmail.com>; niall.litchfield_at_gmail.com<mailto:niall.litchfield_at_gmail.com>
Subject: RE: Meltdown and spectre
According to this the RHEL fixes can be overridden if you need performance.
https://access.redhat.com/articles/3307751<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__access.redhat.com_articles_3307751&d=DwMFaQ&c=j-EkbjBYwkAB4f8ZbVn1Fw&r=yWMFosURAngbt8VLeJtKLVJGefQxustAZ9UxecV7xpc&m=DefUibHP8mOarbcy_Sqc0vqq2lYmneEXAHlsUQivcb8&s=Ts69z7hsaaCuS9AcmtuVLi-4TXmIiEJGiIY3-U623JU&e=>
They say bare-metal and containers have similar overheads, but virtual guests are likely to be hit harder...
Cheers
Tim... (On crappy phone)
On 5 Jan 2018 7:04 pm, <rajendra.pande_at_ubs.com<mailto:rajendra.pande_at_ubs.com>> wrote: The answer (ref meltdown) apparently is KAISER that has shown to be effective against Meltdown and hence (I guess) updates to the OS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-intel-researcher/how-a-researcher-hacked-his-own-computer-and-found-worst-chip-flaw-idUSKBN1ET1ZR<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.reuters.com_article_us-2Dcyber-2Dintel-2Dresearcher_how-2Da-2Dresearcher-2Dhacked-2Dhis-2Down-2Dcomputer-2Dand-2Dfound-2Dworst-2Dchip-2Dflaw-2DidUSKBN1ET1ZR&d=DwMFaQ&c=j-EkbjBYwkAB4f8ZbVn1Fw&r=yWMFosURAngbt8VLeJtKLVJGefQxustAZ9UxecV7xpc&m=DefUibHP8mOarbcy_Sqc0vqq2lYmneEXAHlsUQivcb8&s=5gOzYaSHcG0HE_NGKyIdRbISTO3K7A2PXG2nwkleug0&e=>
From: oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org<mailto:oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org> [mailto:oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org<mailto:oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org>] On Behalf Of Andrew Kerber
Sent: Friday, January 05, 2018 1:58 PM
To: Mark W. Farnham
Cc: ORACLE-L; dmarc-noreply_at_freelists.org<mailto:dmarc-noreply_at_freelists.org>; fmh; niall.litchfield_at_gmail.com<mailto:niall.litchfield_at_gmail.com>; tim_at_oracle-base.com<mailto:tim_at_oracle-base.com>
Subject: Re: Meltdown and spectre
According to what i am reading Meltdown affects only Intel, but AMD is affected by Spectre, as is Intel. And spectre may be a more difficult fix in the long run.
On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 11:55 AM Mark W. Farnham <mwf_at_rsiz.com<mailto:mwf_at_rsiz.com>> wrote: re: 2) was my question:
“So, will there be an “insecure” patch to skip the overhead and rely on server access control?” Follow-up: For all the millions of single user in fact intel based systems, will there be “insecure” patches? The point being, yes, you will have to do patches outside of lab machines kept for particular vintage reasons. Will you be forced to get the performance penalty?
From: oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org<mailto:oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org> [mailto:oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org<mailto:oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org>] On Behalf Of Tim Hall Sent: Friday, January 05, 2018 12:18 PM To: dmarc-noreply_at_freelists.org<mailto:dmarc-noreply_at_freelists.org> Cc: mwf_at_rsiz.com<mailto:mwf_at_rsiz.com>; niall.litchfield_at_gmail.com<mailto:niall.litchfield_at_gmail.com>; andrew.kerber_at_gmail.com<mailto:andrew.kerber_at_gmail.com>; fmh; ORACLE-L
Subject: Re: Meltdown and spectre
Does not compute.
- This is a problem with Intel chips. It's not a problem with Linux. The OS vendors are putting in patches to fix/mitigate issues so you don't have to scrap your Intel servers and replace them with servers with AMD chips.
- Do I need to patch my servers? So you are never going to patch your kernel again? Ever? If you ever do, you will get these fixes. Good luck with never patching stuff again...
Cheers
Tim...
On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:06 PM, Reen, Elizabeth <dmarc-noreply_at_freelists.org<mailto:dmarc-noreply_at_freelists.org>> wrote:
Since all of my servers are in house behind numerous firewalls, do I need to patch everything? The performance hit is going to hurt. Do I need to do that for dev and testing servers which run with redacted data? I could need to double the amount of servers I own. Yes they are cheap, but it adds up after a while. What about licenses? Will I need to up them because I need more iron to do the same work?
I agree that you can’t stop a fully prived account from reading memory under this scenario. It is a bad operating system that lets this happen. Given the say Linux was developed, it is easy for something like this to sneak through. Linux is a great o/s, but you get what you pay for here. The reason it is so popular is that it is so inexpensive. This is not an issue in AIX, Sparc, or HP/UX. They cost money because they have been designed and tested. They did not start out life as an alternative to windows.
Wrapper on every syscall is probably the fastest fix. It is far from the best fix. Hopefully they will put in the correct fix.
Liz
From: oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org<mailto:oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org> [mailto:oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org<mailto:oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org>] On Behalf Of Mark W. Farnham
Sent: Friday, January 05, 2018 8:38 AM
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Cc: 'fmh'; 'ORACLE-L'
Subject: RE: Meltdown and spectre
This also poses what I think is a relevant question for folks who place their physical RDBMS server(s) securely and only have privileged logons anyway. (You really can’t stop a fully privileged account from viewing memory or any other resources anyway and only in memory encryption can frustrate that if a bad actor has gained a privileged access to a server.)
So, will there be an “insecure” patch to skip the overhead and rely on server access control?
Then we can have a fresh round of the debate about whether “physical” or “virtual” is faster with the playing field thus tilted significantly in favor of “physical.”
I also wonder for “virtual” servers whether this could be merely a “hypervisor” patch (which in ring security theory dating back to the 1970’s could establish a memory address bounded area at the privileged account layer (which should be a heckuva lot cheaper than a wrapper on every “syscall.”)
DTSS is lookin’ pretty good right now. Still it was our own fault for not explaining clearly to enough to management that 100 million (plus) copies at $39.95 each was more than 12 copies at $10 million each. Sigh.
mwf
From: oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org<mailto:oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org> [mailto:oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org] On Behalf Of Niall Litchfield
Sent: Thursday, January 04, 2018 10:58 AM
To: andrew.kerber_at_gmail.com<mailto:andrew.kerber_at_gmail.com>
Cc: fmh; ORACLE-L
Subject: Re: Meltdown and spectre
There absolutely should be an OEL patch for this - for the RH kernel they'll probably take upstream - for UEK I'd expect an Oracle patch. I'd expect Oracle shops to be regression testing to determine the likely impact on RDBMS (and java app for that matter) performance.
On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 3:40 PM, Andrew Kerber <andrew.kerber_at_gmail.com<mailto:andrew.kerber_at_gmail.com>> wrote: I was wondering the same thing. But I dont think its up to Oracle to patch this, its going to be at the OS and firmware level. But everything I read says that its going be a huge performance hit, anywhere from 10-50%, and the higher end will be on IO bound systems.
On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 9:33 AM, Fred Habash <fmhabash_at_gmail.com<mailto:fmhabash_at_gmail.com>> wrote: Checked Oracle security bulletins but didn't find anything related. Did Oracle release an official statement for these vulnerabilities at least for the RDBMS and OEL.
Thanks
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Received on Mon Jan 08 2018 - 14:09:34 CET