On Jul 23, 2:09 am, DA Morgan <damor..._at_psoug.org> wrote:
> sybra..._at_hccnet.nl wrote:
> > On Sun, 22 Jul 2007 07:58:35 -0700, DA Morgan <damor..._at_psoug.org>
> > wrote:
>
> >> There is no reason anyone anyone other than the unix user oracle should
> >> be directly accessing executables on the server unless the object is to
> >> compromise system security and render any reasonable interpretation of
> >> auditing moot.
>
> > Actually it is just the opposite. Forcing Unix users to use oracle or
> > to su to oracle poses a security risk. We had an issue once where
> > 'someone' deleted the passwordfile and the init.ora of several
> > databases. Only the unix user oracle could access the database.
> > *Everyone* knew the password.
>
> My point exactly. There are only two people who should ever be able to
> access an Oracle server ... the operating system SA and the DBA. Thus
> no one else needs access to anything on the machine except via SQL*NET
> or a secure and tested interface.
>
> If an organization is sloppy with respect to who has the userid/pwd
> for either the root or oracle then they deserve what they get. Changing
> permission of operating system files will not save anyone from flagrant
> stupidity: Firing those that share passwords will.
> --
> Daniel A. Morgan
> University of Washington
> damor..._at_x.washington.edu (replace x with u to respond)
> Puget Sound Oracle Users Groupwww.psoug.org
You are still not getting it. Is it my English? What I'm trying to
explain is there are situations where multiple administrators are
unavoidable (one reason for that is that no one works 7 x 24).
Using the oracle account for normal administration is dangerous and
even Oracle warns against this in the documentation. The obvious
reason for this is the oracle account is, *without* changing any
permission, capable of deleting any oracle file.
This is why you shouldn't use oracle to administer the database, and
you definitely shouldn't allow telnet or ssh access to oracle.
Preferably you shouldn't allow everyone to su to oracle. Yet in my
situation this is unavoidable. Because if I don't allow this I will
need to maintain the system 365 (or 366) times 7 times 24 hours per
year.
As SYSDBA operations are audited, it is actually advantageous to have
multiple accounts: it allows you to put blame.
--
Sybrand Bakker
Senior Oracle DBA
Received on Mon Jul 23 2007 - 03:24:43 CDT
