Re: Oracle unauthenticated remote system compromise (

On Fri, Feb 21, 2003 at 06:43:48AM -0800, Joan Hsieh wrote:
> Hi Kirti,
>
> We are on v8.1.7.2 32-bit on IBM 4.3.3. I am not sure should we have to
> apply the 8.1.7.4 patch? Sometimes just read the note is very confusing,
> so just apply this patch to upgrade to 8.1.7.4?

Frankly, I don't think it matters what version you run. If Oracle support is inadequate what difference does it make if you run supported or not?

1. 8.1.7.4 is a supported product, but there will be no fully tested patchset for the product (tar 2917445.999). You have to apply the one-off patches, the ones they suggest you not apply (Doc ID: 189489.1).

Read: 8i isn't supported anymore in practice.

2. I opened a tar last week asking if the patches for alerts # 48-51

   would be included in the 9.2.0.3 patchset. Still no answer, still    no patchset.

Read: Your last line of defense has moved out from Oracle software to

      the firewall.

Skip Oracle support and verify your firewalls are functioning well. Install host based firewalls such as iptables or ipfilters. Sun has something called Sunscreen. This should be done whether Oracle figures out their mess or not.

> Joan
>
> "Deshpande, Kirti" wrote:
> >
> > Hello All,
> > If anyone successfully applied this patch (for Alert #51) to 8.1.7.4 32-bit on HP-UX 11.0, please let me know. It seems that the patch is not able to find a couple of required lib files. Nothing found on the Metalink of any help... (I will log an iTAR soon).
> >
> > No problem on AIX, though.
> >
> > Thanks.
> >
> > - Kirti
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2003 4:01 PM
> > To: Multiple recipients of list ORACLE-L
> > )
> >
> > "This electronic message contains information which may be confidential,
> > privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure. The information is
> > intended to be used solely by the named recipient(s). If you are not a
> > named recipient, any review, disclosure, copying, distribution or use
> > of this transmission or its contents is prohibited. If you have received
> > this transmission in error, please notify me immediately."
> >
> > ----- Forwarded by Jared Still/Radisys_Corporation/US on 02/20/2003 01:58
> > PM -----
> >
> > "NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <nisr_at_nextgenss.com>
> > 02/17/2003 02:09 PM
> >
> >
> > To: <bugtraq_at_securityfocus.com>
> > cc:
> > Subject: Oracle unauthenticated remote system compromise (#NISR16022003a)
> >
> > NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory
> >
> > Name: Oracle unauthenticated remote system compromise
> > Systems Affected: All platforms; Oracle9i Database Release 2, 9i Release
> > 1,
> > 8i, 8.1.7, 8.0.6
> > Severity: Critical Risk
> > Category: Remote System Buffer Overrun
> > Vendor URL: http://www.oracle.com
> > Author: Mark Litchfield (mark_at_ngssoftware.com)
> > Date: 16th February 2003
> > Advisory number: #NISR16022003a
> >
> > Description
> > ***********
> > Oracle is the leader in the database market with a 54% market share lead
> > under ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning). The database server is
> > vulnerable
> > to a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability. What exacerbates
> > this problem is that no valid User ID or password is required by an
> > attacker.
> >
> > Details
> > *******
> > There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability in the
> > authentication process with the Oracle Database Server. By supplying an
> > overly long username when attempting to log onto the database server an
> > attacker can overflow a stack based buffer overwriting the saved return
> > address. Any arbitrary code supplied by an attacker would execute with
> > the
> > same privileges as the user running the service; this account is typically
> > "Oracle" on linux/unix based platforms and Local System on Windows based
> > operating systems such as NT/2000/XP. As such this allows for a complete
> > compromise of the data stored in the database and possibly a complete
> > compromise of the operating system. As most client applications for
> > Oracle
> > will tuncate the length of the username that can be supplied to the
> > database
> > an attacker would need to write their own Oracle "Authenticator" to
> > exploit
> > this issue. That said, NGSSoftware has found one client application that
> > will allow longer usernames so to test if you are vulnerable to this
> > issue,
> > use the LOADPSP utility usually found in "bin" directory found under the
> > OracleHomeInstallDirectory. On Windows, for example, run:
> >
> > C:\ora9ias\BIN>loadpsp -name -user LONGUSERNAME/tiger_at_iasdb myfile
> >
> > Fix Information
> > ***************
> > NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 30th September 2002.
> > Oracle has reviewed the code and created a patch which is available from:
> >
> > http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert51.pdf
> >
> > NGSSoftware advise Oracle database customers to review and install the
> > patch
> > as a matter of urgency.
> >
> > A check for these issues has been added to NGSSQuirreL for Oracle, a
> > comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Database
> > Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite
> >
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/software/squirrelfororacle.html
> >
> > It is further recommend that Oracle DBAs have their network/firewall
> > administrators ensure that the database server is protected from Internet
> > sourced traffic.
> >
> > Further Information
> > *******************
> > For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows,
> > please see
> >
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf
> >
> > About NGSSoftware
> > *****************
> > NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application
> > security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware
> > have
> > offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland.
> > NGSSoftware's
> > sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting
> > services, specialising in application, host and network security
> > assessments.
> >
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/
> > http://www.ngsconsulting.com/
> >
> > Telephone +44 208 401 0070
> > Fax +44 208 401 0076
> >
> > enquiries_at_ngssoftware.com
> >
> > ----- Forwarded by Jared Still/Radisys_Corporation/US on 02/20/2003 01:58
> > PM -----
> >
> > "NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <nisr_at_nextgenss.com>
> > 02/17/2003 02:12 PM
> >
> >
> > To: <bugtraq_at_securityfocus.com>
> > cc:
> > Subject: Oracle TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ Remote System Buffer Overrun (#NISR16022003b)
> >
> > NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory
> >
> > Name: Oracle TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ Remote System Buffer Overrun
> > Systems Affected: All platforms; Oracle9i Database Release 2, 9i Release
> > 1,
> > 8i, 8.1.7, 8.0.6
> > Severity: High Risk
> > Category: Remote System Buffer Overrun
> > Vendor URL: http://www.oracle.com
> > Author: Mark Litchfield (mark_at_ngssoftware.com)
> > Date: 16th February 2003
> > Advisory number: #NISR16022003b
> >
> > Description
> > ***********
> > Oracle's database server contains fuctions for use within queries. The
> > TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ function exists to convert a string into a timestamp with
> > a
> > time zone datatype. This function contains an exploitable buffer overflow
> > vulnerability.
> >
> > Details
> > *******
> > There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability in the
> > TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ function. A normal statement would look like the
> > following,
> > converting a character string string to a value of timestamp with time
> > zone:
> >
> > SELECT TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ('2003-02-016 12:00:00 -8:00','YYYY-MM-DD HH:MI:SS
> > TZH:TZM') FROM DUAL;
> >
> > By supplying a long character string for the second parameter an attacker
> > can overwirte a saved return address on the stack of Oracle process.
> > Before
> > this issue can be exploited an attacker must be able to log on to the
> > database server with a valid user ID and password, but as the
> > TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ() function can be executed by PUBLIC by default any user
> > of
> > the system can gain control. Any arbitrary code supplied by an attacker
> > would execute with the same privileges as the user running the service;
> > this
> > account is typically "Oracle" on linux/unix based platforms and Local
> > System
> > on Windows based operating systems such as NT/2000/XP. As such this allows
> > for a complete compromise of the data stored in the database and possibly
> > a
> > complete compromise of the operating system.
> >
> > Fix Information
> > ***************
> > NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 30th September 2002
> > and
> > Oracle has produced a patch which is available from
> >
> > http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert50.pdf
> >
> > A check for these issues has been added to NGSSQuirreL for Oracle, a
> > comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Database
> > Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite
> >
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/software/squirrelfororacle.html
> >
> > Further Information
> > *******************
> > For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows,
> > please see
> >
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf
> >
> > About NGSSoftware
> > *****************
> > NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application
> > security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware
> > have
> > offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland.
> > NGSSoftware's
> > sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting
> > services, specialising in application, host and network security
> > assessments.
> >
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/
> > http://www.ngsconsulting.com/
> >
> > Telephone +44 208 401 0070
> > Fax +44 208 401 0076
> >
> > enquiries_at_ngssoftware.com
> >
> > ----- Forwarded by Jared Still/Radisys_Corporation/US on 02/20/2003 01:58
> > PM -----
> >
> > "NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <nisr_at_nextgenss.com>
> > 02/17/2003 02:17 PM
> >
> >
> > To: <bugtraq_at_securityfocus.com>
> > cc:
> > Subject: Oracle9i Application Server Format String Vulnerability (#NISR16022003d)
> >
> > NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory
> >
> > Name: Oracle9i Application Server Format String Vulnerability
> > Systems Affected: All platforms; Oracle9i Application Server Release
> > 9.0.2
> > Severity: Critical Risk
> > Category: Format String Vulnerability
> > Vendor URL: http://www.oracle.com
> > Author: David Litchfield (david_at_ngssoftware) and Mark Litchfield
> > (mark_at_ngssoftware.com)
> > Date: 16th February 2003
> > Advisory number: #NISR16022003d
> >
> > Description
> > ***********
> > Oracle's 9i Application Server offers a highly functional web server
> > designed to seamlessly integrate with an Oracle backend database server.
> > Based on Apache the server offers many environments for web based
> > applications such as Java/JSP, PL/SQL, Perl and FastCGI. With their latest
> > release of the Application Server, 9.0.2, Oracle has added support for
> > WebDAV, Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning, that turns the Web into
> > a
> > file sharing system.
> >
> > Details
> > *******
> > DAV is turned on by default. Whilst this is bad in and of itself, as
> > attackers can anonymously upload files to the server, an attacker can
> > exploit a format string bug in the one of the logging functions. If an
> > attacker uses the COPY method and supplies a destination URI that uses a
> > different scheme or port then a 502 Bad Gateway response is returned. This
> > is logged and in doing so the format string can be exploited. Although the
> > Apache mod dav module is not vulnerable itself the vulnerable code is
> > there - it is just not ever executed. Oracle has modified the moddav
> > module
> > and changed it so bad gateway responses are logged - and thus they are
> > vulnerable. Looking at the moddav source
> >
> > >From mod_dav.c revision 1.157
> >
> > ..
> > ..
> > lookup = dav_lookup_uri(dest, r);
> > if (lookup.rnew == NULL)
> > {
> > if (lookup.err.status == HTTP_BAD_REQUEST)
> > {
> > ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR | APLOG_NOERRNO,
> > r,lookup.err.desc);
> > return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
> > }
> > return dav_error_response(r, lookup.err.status, lookup.err.desc);
> > }
> > ..
> > ..
> >
> > This code calls the dav_lookup_uri() function in dav_util.c. From
> > dav_util.c
> > revision 1.84
> >
> > ..
> > dav_lookup_result dav_lookup_uri(const char *uri, request_rec * r)
> > {
> > ..
> > ..
> > if (strcasecmp(comp.scheme, scheme) != 0 || comp.port != port)
> > {
> > result.err.status = HTTP_BAD_GATEWAY;
> > result.err.desc = ap_psprintf(r->pool,
> > "Destination URI refers to different "
> > "scheme or port (%s://hostname:%d)\n"
> > "(want: %s://hostname:%d)",
> > comp.scheme ? comp.scheme : scheme,
> > comp.port ? comp.port : port,
> > scheme, port);
> >
> > return result;
> >
> > ..
> > ..
> > }
> >
> > When dav_lookup_uri() returns to mod_dav.c the format strings occurs
> >
> > ..
> > lookup = dav_lookup_uri(dest, r);
> > if (lookup.rnew == NULL)
> > {
> > if (lookup.err.status == HTTP_BAD_REQUEST)
> > {
> > // THIS IS THE FIRST FORMAT STRING VULNERABILITY
> > ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR | APLOG_NOERRNO,
> > r,lookup.err.desc);
> > ..
> > ..
> > }
> >
> > Of course the code should have read
> >
> > ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR | APLOG_NOERRNO,
> > r,"%s",lookup.err.desc);
> >
> > to not be vulnerable.
> >
> > By crafting a specially formed format string and sending to the server an
> > attacker can overwrite arbitrary address with arbitrary values which can
> > allow an attacker to gain control of the web server. To do this they could
> > overwrite a saved return address on the stack, an exception handler or
> > pointer to a function with an address that points to a buffer that
> > contains
> > the arbitrary code to execute.
> >
> > Fix Information
> > ***************
> > NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 24th September 2002.
> > Oracle has developed a patch which is available from
> >
> > http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert52.pdf
> >
> > A check for these issues has been added to OraScan, a comprehensive
> > automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Application Servers of
> > which more information is available from the NGSSite
> >
> > http://www.nextgenss.com/software/orascan.html
> >
> > About NGSSoftware
> > *****************
> > NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application
> > security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware
> > have
> > offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland.
> > NGSSoftware's
> > sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting
> > services, specialising in application, host and network security
> > assessments.
> >
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/
> > http://www.ngsconsulting.com/
> >
> > Telephone +44 208 401 0070
> > Fax +44 208 401 0076
> >
> > enquiries_at_ngssoftware.com
> >
> > ----- Forwarded by Jared Still/Radisys_Corporation/US on 02/20/2003 01:58
> > PM -----
> >
> > "NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <nisr_at_nextgenss.com>
> > 02/17/2003 02:15 PM
> >
> >
> > To: <bugtraq_at_securityfocus.com>
> > cc:
> > Subject: Oracle TZ_OFFSET Remote System Buffer Overrun (#NISR16022003c)
> >
> > NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory
> >
> > Name: Oracle TZ_OFFSET Remote System Buffer Overrun
> > Systems Affected: All platforms; Oracle9i Database Release 2, 9i Release
> > 1,
> > 8i, 8.1.7, 8.0.6
> > Severity: High Risk
> > Category: Remote System Buffer Overrun
> > Vendor URL: http://www.oracle.com
> > Author: Mark Litchfield (mark_at_ngssoftware.com)
> > Date: 16th February 2003
> > Advisory number: #NISR16022003c
> >
> > Description
> > ***********
> > Oracle's database server contains fuctions for use within queries. The
> > TZ_OFFSET function returns the time zone offset corresponding to the value
> > entered based on the date the statement was executed. For example:
> >
> > SELECT TZ_OFFSET('US/Eastern') FROM DUAL;
> >
> > would return the time zone offset value of -04:00. The TZ_OFFSET()
> > function
> > contains a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability.
> >
> > Details
> > *******
> > There exists a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability in the
> > TZ_OFFSET function. By supplying a long character string for the time zone
> > name an attacker can overwrite a saved return address on the stack of
> > Oracle
> > process. Before this issue can be exploited an attacker must be able to
> > log
> > on to the database server with a valid user ID and password, but as the
> > TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ() function can be executed by PUBLIC by default any user
> > of
> > the system can gain control. Any arbitrary code supplied by an attacker
> > would execute with the same privileges as the user running the service;
> > this
> > account is typically "Oracle" on linux/unix based platforms and Local
> > System
> > on Windows based operating systems such as NT/2000/XP. As such this allows
> > for a complete compromise of the data stored in the database and possibly
> > a
> > complete compromise of the operating system.
> >
> > Fix Information
> > ***************
> > NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 30th September 2002.
> > Oracle has developed a patch which is available from
> >
> > http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert50.pdf
> >
> > A check for these issues has been added to NGSSQuirreL for Oracle, a
> > comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Database
> > Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite
> >
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/software/squirrelfororacle.html
> >
> > Further Information
> > *******************
> > For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows,
> > please see
> >
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf
> >
> > About NGSSoftware
> > *****************
> > NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application
> > security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware
> > have
> > offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland.
> > NGSSoftware's
> > sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting
> > services, specialising in application, host and network security
> > assessments.
> >
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/
> > http://www.ngsconsulting.com/
> >
> > Telephone +44 208 401 0070
> > Fax +44 208 401 0076
> >
> > enquiries_at_ngssoftware.com
> >
> > ----- Forwarded by Jared Still/Radisys_Corporation/US on 02/20/2003 01:58
> > PM -----
> >
> > "NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <nisr_at_nextgenss.com>
> > 02/17/2003 05:09 PM
> >
> >
> > To: <bugtraq_at_securityfocus.com>, <vulnwatch_at_vulnwatch.org>,
> > <ntbugtraq_at_listserv.ntbugtraq.com>
> > cc:
> > Subject: Oracle bfilename function buffer overflow vulnerability (#NISR16022003e)
> >
> > NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory
> >
> > Name: ORACLE bfilename function buffer overflow vulnerability
> > Systems Affected: All platforms; Oracle9i Database Release 2, 9i Release
> > 1,
> > 8i, 8.1.7, 8.0.6
> > Severity: High Risk
> > Category: Remote System Buffer Overrun
> > Vendor URL: http://www.oracle.com
> > Author: David Litchfield (david_at_ngssoftware.com)
> > Date: 16th February 2003
> > Advisory number: #NISR16022003e
> >
> > Description
> > ***********
> > Oracle's database server contains fuctions for use within queries. The
> > bfilename() function returns a BFILE locator to a binary large object
> > stored
> > in the database.
> >
> > Details
> > *******
> > The bfilename() function suffers from a remotely exploitable buffer
> > overrun
> > when an overly long DIRECTORY parameter is supplied. Before this issue can
> > be exploited an attacker must be able to log on to the database server
> > with
> > a valid user ID and password, but as the bfilename() function can be
> > executed by PUBLIC by default any user of the system can gain control. Any
> > arbitrary code supplied by an attacker would execute with the same
> > privileges as the user running the service; this account is typically
> > "Oracle" on linux/unix based platforms and Local System on Windows based
> > operating systems such as NT/2000/XP. As such this allows for a complete
> > compromise of the data stored in the database and possibly a complete
> > compromise of the operating system.
> >
> > Fix Information
> > ***************
> > NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 30th September 2002.
> > Oracle has developed a patch which is available from
> >
> > http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert50.pdf
> >
> > A check for these issues has been added to NGSSQuirreL for Oracle, a
> > comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Database
> > Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite
> >
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/software/squirrelfororacle.html
> >
> > Further Information
> > *******************
> > For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows,
> > please see
> >
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf
> >
> > About NGSSoftware
> > *****************
> > NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application
> > security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware
> > have
> > offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland.
> > NGSSoftware's
> > sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting
> > services, specialising in application, host and network security
> > assessments.
> >
> > http://www.ngssoftware.com/
> > http://www.ngsconsulting.com/
> >
> > Telephone +44 208 401 0070
> > Fax +44 208 401 0076
> >
> > enquiries_at_ngssoftware.com
> >
> > --
> > Please see the official ORACLE-L FAQ: http://www.orafaq.net
> > --
> > Author:
> > INET: Jared.Still_at_radisys.com
> >
> > Fat City Network Services -- 858-538-5051 http://www.fatcity.com
> > San Diego, California -- Mailing list and web hosting services
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> > (or the name of mailing list you want to be removed from). You may
> > also send the HELP command for other information (like subscribing).
> >
> > --
> > Please see the official ORACLE-L FAQ: http://www.orafaq.net
> > --
> > Author: Deshpande, Kirti
> > INET: kirti.deshpande_at_verizon.com
> >
> > Fat City Network Services -- 858-538-5051 http://www.fatcity.com
> > San Diego, California -- Mailing list and web hosting services
> > ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> > To REMOVE yourself from this mailing list, send an E-Mail message
> > to: ListGuru_at_fatcity.com (note EXACT spelling of 'ListGuru') and in
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> > (or the name of mailing list you want to be removed from). You may
> > also send the HELP command for other information (like subscribing).
> --
> Please see the official ORACLE-L FAQ: http://www.orafaq.net
> --
> Author: Joan Hsieh
> INET: joan.hsieh_at_tufts.edu
>
> Fat City Network Services -- 858-538-5051 http://www.fatcity.com
> San Diego, California -- Mailing list and web hosting services
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> To REMOVE yourself from this mailing list, send an E-Mail message
> to: ListGuru_at_fatcity.com (note EXACT spelling of 'ListGuru') and in
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> (or the name of mailing list you want to be removed from). You may
> also send the HELP command for other information (like subscribing).

-- 
===============================================================
Ray Stell   stellr_at_vt.edu     (540) 231-4109     KE4TJC    28^D
-- 
Please see the official ORACLE-L FAQ: http://www.orafaq.net
-- 
Author: Ray Stell
  INET: stellr_at_cns.vt.edu

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