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Home -> Community -> Mailing Lists -> Oracle-L -> Oracle unauthenticated remote system compromise (#NISR16022003a)

Oracle unauthenticated remote system compromise (#NISR16022003a)

From: <Jared.Still_at_radisys.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2003 14:00:59 -0800
Message-ID: <F001.0055392F.20030220140059@fatcity.com> 





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"NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <nisr_at_nextgenss.com>

 02/17/2003 02:09 PM

 

        To:     <bugtraq_at_securityfocus.com>
        cc: 
        Subject:        Oracle unauthenticated remote system compromise (#NISR16022003a)






NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory



Name:    Oracle unauthenticated remote system compromise
Systems Affected:  All platforms; Oracle9i Database Release 2, 9i Release 
1,


8i, 8.1.7, 8.0.6


Severity:  Critical Risk


Category:               Remote System Buffer Overrun
Vendor URL:   http://www.oracle.com


Author:   Mark Litchfield (mark_at_ngssoftware.com)
Date:   16th February 2003


Advisory number: #NISR16022003a




Description




Oracle is the leader in the database market with a 54% market share lead
under ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning). The database server is 
vulnerable


to a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability. What exacerbates
this problem is that no valid User ID or password is required by an
attacker.



Details




There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability in the
authentication process with the Oracle Database Server.  By supplying an
overly long username when attempting to log onto the database server an
attacker can overflow a stack based buffer overwriting the saved return
address.  Any arbitrary code supplied by an attacker would execute with 
the


same privileges as the user running the service; this account is typically


"Oracle" on linux/unix based platforms and Local System on Windows based

operating systems such as NT/2000/XP. As such this allows for a complete
compromise of the data stored in the database and possibly a complete
compromise of the operating system.  As most client applications for 
Oracle


will tuncate the length of the username that can be supplied to the 
database


an attacker would need to write their own Oracle "Authenticator" to 
exploit


this issue. That said, NGSSoftware has found one client application that
will allow longer usernames so to test if you are vulnerable to this 
issue,


use the LOADPSP utility usually found in "bin" directory found under the
OracleHomeInstallDirectory. On Windows, for example, run:



C:\ora9ias\BIN>loadpsp -name -user LONGUSERNAME/tiger_at_iasdb myfile




Fix Information




NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 30th September 2002.
Oracle has reviewed the code and created a patch which is available from:



http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert51.pdf



NGSSoftware advise Oracle database customers to review and install the 
patch


as a matter of urgency.



A check for these issues has been added to NGSSQuirreL for Oracle, a
comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Database
Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite



http://www.ngssoftware.com/software/squirrelfororacle.html



It is further recommend that Oracle DBAs have their network/firewall
administrators ensure that the database server is protected from Internet
sourced traffic.




Further Information




For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows,
please see


http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf





About NGSSoftware




NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application
security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware 
have


offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland. 
NGSSoftware's


sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting
services, specialising in application, host and network security
assessments.



http://www.ngssoftware.com/


http://www.ngsconsulting.com/



Telephone +44 208 401 0070


Fax +44 208 401 0076



enquiries_at_ngssoftware.com








"NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <nisr_at_nextgenss.com>

 02/17/2003 02:12 PM

 

        To:     <bugtraq_at_securityfocus.com>
        cc: 
        Subject:        Oracle TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ Remote System Buffer Overrun (#NISR16022003b)






NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory



Name:    Oracle TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ Remote System Buffer Overrun
Systems Affected:  All platforms; Oracle9i Database Release 2, 9i Release 
1,


8i, 8.1.7, 8.0.6


Severity:  High Risk


Category:               Remote System Buffer Overrun
Vendor URL:   http://www.oracle.com


Author:   Mark Litchfield (mark_at_ngssoftware.com)
Date:   16th February 2003


Advisory number: #NISR16022003b




Description




Oracle's database server contains fuctions for use within queries. The
TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ function exists to convert a string into a timestamp with 
a


time zone datatype. This function contains an exploitable buffer overflow
vulnerability.



Details




There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability in the
TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ function. A normal statement would look like the 
following,


converting a character string string to a value of timestamp with time 
zone:



SELECT TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ('2003-02-016 12:00:00 -8:00','YYYY-MM-DD HH:MI:SS

TZH:TZM') FROM DUAL;


By supplying a long character string for the second parameter an attacker
can overwirte a saved return address on the stack of Oracle process. 
Before


this issue can be exploited an attacker must be able to log on to the
database server with a valid user ID and password, but as the
TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ() function can be executed by PUBLIC by default any user 
of


the system can gain control. Any arbitrary code supplied by an attacker
would execute with the same privileges as the user running the service; 
this


account is typically "Oracle" on linux/unix based platforms and Local 
System


on Windows based operating systems such as NT/2000/XP. As such this allows
for a complete compromise of the data stored in the database and possibly 
a


complete compromise of the operating system.



Fix Information




NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 30th September 2002 
and


Oracle has produced a patch which is available from



http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert50.pdf



A check for these issues has been added to NGSSQuirreL for Oracle, a
comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Database
Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite



http://www.ngssoftware.com/software/squirrelfororacle.html



Further Information




For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows,
please see


http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf





About NGSSoftware




NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application
security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware 
have


offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland. 
NGSSoftware's


sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting
services, specialising in application, host and network security
assessments.



http://www.ngssoftware.com/


http://www.ngsconsulting.com/



Telephone +44 208 401 0070


Fax +44 208 401 0076



enquiries_at_ngssoftware.com








"NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <nisr_at_nextgenss.com>

 02/17/2003 02:17 PM

 

        To:     <bugtraq_at_securityfocus.com>
        cc: 
        Subject:        Oracle9i Application Server Format String Vulnerability (#NISR16022003d)






NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory



Name:    Oracle9i Application Server Format String Vulnerability
Systems Affected:  All platforms; Oracle9i Application Server Release 
9.0.2


Severity:  Critical Risk


Category:               Format String Vulnerability
Vendor URL:   http://www.oracle.com


Author:   David Litchfield (david_at_ngssoftware) and Mark Litchfield
(mark_at_ngssoftware.com)


Date:   16th February 2003


Advisory number: #NISR16022003d




Description




Oracle's 9i Application Server offers a highly functional web server
designed to seamlessly integrate with an Oracle backend database server.
Based on Apache the server offers many environments for web based
applications such as Java/JSP, PL/SQL, Perl and FastCGI. With their latest
release of the Application Server, 9.0.2, Oracle has added support for
WebDAV, Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning, that turns the Web into 
a


file sharing system.




Details




DAV is turned on by default. Whilst this is bad in and of itself, as
attackers can anonymously upload files to the server, an attacker can
exploit a format string bug in the one of the logging functions. If an
attacker uses the COPY method and supplies a destination URI that uses a
different scheme or port then a 502 Bad Gateway response is returned. This
is logged and in doing so the format string can be exploited. Although the
Apache mod dav module is not vulnerable itself the vulnerable code is
there - it is just not ever executed. Oracle has modified the moddav 
module


and changed it so bad gateway responses are logged - and thus they are
vulnerable. Looking at the moddav source



>From mod_dav.c revision 1.157



..


..


lookup = dav_lookup_uri(dest, r);


if (lookup.rnew == NULL)


{

      if (lookup.err.status == HTTP_BAD_REQUEST)
      {
            ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR | APLOG_NOERRNO,
r,lookup.err.desc);
            return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
      }
      return dav_error_response(r, lookup.err.status, lookup.err.desc);


}


..


..



This code calls the dav_lookup_uri() function in dav_util.c. From 
dav_util.c


revision 1.84



..


dav_lookup_result dav_lookup_uri(const char *uri, request_rec * r)
{


..


..


if (strcasecmp(comp.scheme, scheme) != 0 || comp.port != port)
{

      result.err.status = HTTP_BAD_GATEWAY;
      result.err.desc = ap_psprintf(r->pool,
      "Destination URI refers to different "
      "scheme or port (%s://hostname:%d)\n"
      "(want: %s://hostname:%d)",
      comp.scheme ? comp.scheme : scheme,
      comp.port ? comp.port : port,
      scheme, port);

      return result;





..


..


}



When dav_lookup_uri() returns to mod_dav.c the format strings occurs



..


lookup = dav_lookup_uri(dest, r);


if (lookup.rnew == NULL)


{

      if (lookup.err.status == HTTP_BAD_REQUEST)
      {
      // THIS IS THE FIRST FORMAT STRING VULNERABILITY
      ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR | APLOG_NOERRNO,


r,lookup.err.desc);


..


..


}




Of course the code should have read



ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR | APLOG_NOERRNO,
r,"%s",lookup.err.desc);



to not be vulnerable.



By crafting a specially formed format string and sending to the server an
attacker can overwrite arbitrary address with arbitrary values which can
allow an attacker to gain control of the web server. To do this they could
overwrite a saved return address on the stack, an exception handler or
pointer to a function with an address that points to a buffer that 
contains


the arbitrary code to execute.



Fix Information




NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 24th September 2002.
Oracle has developed a patch which is available from



http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert52.pdf



A check for these issues has been added to OraScan, a comprehensive
automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Application Servers of
which more information is available from the NGSSite



http://www.nextgenss.com/software/orascan.html



About NGSSoftware




NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application
security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware 
have


offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland. 
NGSSoftware's


sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting
services, specialising in application, host and network security
assessments.



http://www.ngssoftware.com/


http://www.ngsconsulting.com/



Telephone +44 208 401 0070


Fax +44 208 401 0076



enquiries_at_ngssoftware.com









"NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <nisr_at_nextgenss.com>

 02/17/2003 02:15 PM

 

        To:     <bugtraq_at_securityfocus.com>
        cc: 
        Subject:        Oracle TZ_OFFSET Remote System Buffer Overrun (#NISR16022003c)






NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory



Name:    Oracle TZ_OFFSET Remote System Buffer Overrun
Systems Affected:  All platforms; Oracle9i Database Release 2, 9i Release 
1,


8i, 8.1.7, 8.0.6


Severity:  High Risk


Category:               Remote System Buffer Overrun
Vendor URL:   http://www.oracle.com


Author:   Mark Litchfield (mark_at_ngssoftware.com)
Date:   16th February 2003


Advisory number: #NISR16022003c



Description




Oracle's database server contains fuctions for use within queries. The
TZ_OFFSET function returns the time zone offset corresponding to the value
entered based on the date the statement was executed. For example:



SELECT TZ_OFFSET('US/Eastern') FROM DUAL;



would return the time zone offset value of -04:00. The TZ_OFFSET() 
function


contains a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability.




Details




There exists a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability in the
TZ_OFFSET function. By supplying a long character string for the time zone
name an attacker can overwrite a saved return address on the stack of 
Oracle


process.  Before this issue can be exploited an attacker must be able to 
log


on to the database server with a valid user ID and password, but as the
TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ() function can be executed by PUBLIC by default any user 
of


the system can gain control. Any arbitrary code supplied by an attacker
would execute with the same privileges as the user running the service; 
this


account is typically "Oracle" on linux/unix based platforms and Local 
System


on Windows based operating systems such as NT/2000/XP. As such this allows
for a complete compromise of the data stored in the database and possibly 
a


complete compromise of the operating system.




Fix Information




NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 30th September 2002.
Oracle has developed a patch which is available from



http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert50.pdf



A check for these issues has been added to NGSSQuirreL for Oracle, a
comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Database
Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite



http://www.ngssoftware.com/software/squirrelfororacle.html



Further Information




For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows,
please see


http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf






About NGSSoftware




NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application
security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware 
have


offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland. 
NGSSoftware's


sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting
services, specialising in application, host and network security
assessments.



http://www.ngssoftware.com/


http://www.ngsconsulting.com/



Telephone +44 208 401 0070


Fax +44 208 401 0076



enquiries_at_ngssoftware.com








"NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <nisr_at_nextgenss.com>

 02/17/2003 05:09 PM

 


        To:     <bugtraq_at_securityfocus.com>, <vulnwatch_at_vulnwatch.org>, 
<ntbugtraq_at_listserv.ntbugtraq.com>

        cc: 
        Subject:        Oracle bfilename function buffer overflow vulnerability (#NISR16022003e)






NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory



Name:    ORACLE bfilename function buffer overflow vulnerability
Systems Affected:  All platforms; Oracle9i Database Release 2, 9i Release 
1,


8i, 8.1.7, 8.0.6


Severity:  High Risk


Category: Remote System Buffer Overrun


Vendor URL:   http://www.oracle.com


Author:   David Litchfield (david_at_ngssoftware.com)
Date:   16th February 2003


Advisory number: #NISR16022003e




Description




Oracle's database server contains fuctions for use within queries. The
bfilename() function returns a BFILE locator to a binary large object 
stored


in the database.



Details




The bfilename() function suffers from a remotely exploitable buffer 
overrun


when an overly long DIRECTORY parameter is supplied. Before this issue can
be exploited an attacker must be able to log on to the database server 
with


a valid user ID and password, but as the bfilename() function can be
executed by PUBLIC by default any user of the system can gain control. Any
arbitrary code supplied by an attacker would execute with the same
privileges as the user running the service; this account is typically


"Oracle" on linux/unix based platforms and Local System on Windows based

operating systems such as NT/2000/XP. As such this allows for a complete
compromise of the data stored in the database and possibly a complete
compromise of the operating system.




Fix Information




NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 30th September 2002.
Oracle has developed a patch which is available from



http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert50.pdf



A check for these issues has been added to NGSSQuirreL for Oracle, a
comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Database
Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite



http://www.ngssoftware.com/software/squirrelfororacle.html



Further Information




For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows,
please see


http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf





About NGSSoftware




NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application
security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware 
have


offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland. 
NGSSoftware's


sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting
services, specialising in application, host and network security
assessments.



http://www.ngssoftware.com/


http://www.ngsconsulting.com/



Telephone +44 208 401 0070


Fax +44 208 401 0076



enquiries_at_ngssoftware.com





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